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A Remedy for Online Exposure: Recognizing the 
Public-Disclosure Tort in North Carolina 
ABSTRACT 
North Carolina is one of only a few jurisdictions that does not recognize 
the tort of public disclosure of private facts—a civil remedy that protects 
against the offensive and unauthorized publication of private information 
that is not of legitimate public concern.  The absence of this tort has 
created a gap in privacy protection in the state that is increasingly 
problematic with the rise of revenge porn and other online injuries made 
possible by the widespread use of the Internet and online social networking 
sites.  This Comment specifically explores how recognition of the tort of 
public disclosure of private facts in North Carolina would give victims of 
revenge porn a viable civil remedy and help close the state’s existing 
privacy gap. 
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INTRODUCTION 
North Carolina’s failure to recognize the tort of public disclosure of 
private facts1 leaves a gap in privacy protection for North Carolina 
citizens.2  This lack of protection is increasingly problematic with the rise 
of “revenge porn,” a practice where sexually explicit images or videos are 
disclosed online without the consent of the pictured individual.3 
The story of Holly Jacobs illustrates the growing problem of revenge 
porn.  In 2009, Jacobs broke up with her boyfriend of several years.4  
During the course of the relationship, Jacobs sent her boyfriend intimate 
photos and videos, fully trusting that he would keep them private.5  After 
their breakup, her then ex-boyfriend posted several of the photos and a 
video on the Internet without her permission, and these images quickly 
went viral.6  He also posted Jacobs’s full name, e-mail address, job title, 
and specific details of where she worked and how far along she was in her 
 
 1. This tort primarily addresses the harm that one suffers to his reputation when 
private information is unreasonably disclosed to the public.  The tort offers valuable 
protection for the reputational harms not covered by defamation because of the veracity of 
the disclosed facts.  See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 398 (1960) 
(noting that this tort is an “extension of defamation,” remedying serious harm that would 
otherwise not be actionable). 
 2. Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 717 (N.C. 1988) (rejecting the public disclosure of 
private facts as a cause of action in North Carolina). 
 3. This terminology was used by the Criminal Court of the City of New York.  See 
People v. Barber, No. 2013NY059761, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 638, at *1 n.1 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. Feb. 18, 2014); see also Clay Calvert, Revenge Porn and Freedom of Expression: 
Legislative Pushback to an Online Weapon of Emotional and Reputational Destruction, 24 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 678–79 (2014) (providing alternative 
definitions and examples of revenge porn). 
 4. Beth Stebner, “I’m Tired of Hiding”: Revenge-Porn Victim Speaks Out Over Her 
Abuse After She Claims Ex Posted Explicit Photos of Her Online, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 3, 
2013, 12:05 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/revenge-porn-victim-speaks- 
article-1.1334147. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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Ph.D. program.7  Jacobs spent the next three years trying to control the 
damage.8  She hired lawyers to send her ex-boyfriend letters, pleaded with 
police and the FBI to press charges, and hired a specialist to help her take 
down the materials.9  Because of the constant online harassment, she left 
her job and changed her name.10   
Unfortunately, Jacobs is part of an ever-increasing group of victims 
who are continually subjected to humiliation and cyber-harassment after 
ex-partners publish and distribute their private images online.11  For 
example, on February 11, 2014, almost seventy nude and sexual images of 
North Carolina high school students were published on Twitter and 
Instagram.12  Many of these images were privately sent to a boyfriend or 
girlfriend, but were subsequently leaked to other students, who then posted 
them on Instagram.13  These images quickly circulated online, and the State 
Bureau of Investigation is now looking into similar instances in nine North 
Carolina counties.14  The people responsible for these disclosures may face 
criminal charges,15 but, as this Comment explains, there are no civil 
 
 7. Holly Jacobs, A Message from Our Founder: Dr. Holly Jacobs, CYBER C.R. 
INITIATIVE (Oct. 6, 2013), http://www.cybercivilrights.org/a_message_from_our_founder_ 
dr_holly_jacobs. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Stebner, supra note 4.  After becoming a victim of revenge porn, Dr. Holly Jacobs 
founded the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative to raise awareness about revenge porn and to strive 
for its elimination.  See Jacobs, supra note 7. 
 11. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing 
the harm suffered by Cecilia Barnes after her ex-boyfriend posted nude photos of Barnes, 
along with her personal information, online); Lorelei Laird, Striking Back at Revenge Porn: 
Victims Are Taking on Websites for Posting Photos They Didn’t Consent To, A.B.A. J., 
Nov. 2013, at 45, 45–46 (describing how victims like Holly Toups and Rebekah Wells have 
spoken out about suffering from involuntary pornography); Erica Goode, Victims Push Laws 
to End Online Revenge Posts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/09/24/us/victims-push-laws-to-end-online-revenge-posts.html?_r=0 (recounting the story 
of revenge-porn victim Marianna Taschinger). 
 12. SBI Investigates 15 Instagram Accounts Linked to Nude Photos of Wake Co. Teens, 
WSAV (last updated May 6, 2014, 10:53 AM), http://www.wsav.com/story/25307973/sbi- 
got-warrant-for-15-accounts-in-photo-probe. 
 13. Rowan Co. Student Accused of Posting Nude Photo, WNCN (last updated Mar. 14, 
2014, 6:47 PM), http://www.wncn.com/story/24856133/rowan-county-student-accused-of- 
posting-nude-photo. 
 14. Investigation into Nude Teen Photos Spreads to More NC Counties, WFLA (Mar. 
12, 2014, 12:08 PM), http://www.wfla.com/story/24829216/investigation-into-nude-teen- 
photos-spreads-to-more-nc-counties. 
 15. Police could bring second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and cyberbullying 
charges.  See Rowan Co. Student, supra note 13; SBI Investigates, supra note 12. 
3
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remedies available in North Carolina to directly address the harm suffered 
by these victims.16 
The experience shared by Jacobs and the North Carolina teenagers is 
increasingly common.  Surveys later conducted by Jacobs reveal that “over 
half (53.3%) of heterosexual respondents had shared a nude photo with 
someone else, and nearly three-quarters (74.8%) of LGBT (lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender) respondents had done so.”17  Statistics reveal 
similar patterns among teenagers and young adults.  One study revealed 
that 44% of teenage males viewed at least one nude photo of a female 
classmate.18  The National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned 
Pregnancy found that 20% of teenagers between the ages of thirteen and 
nineteen had sent or posted sexual images or videos of themselves.19  The 
rate for young adults between ages twenty and twenty-six is even higher, at 
33%.20 
The nonconsensual distribution of sexual images and videos is also on 
the rise.  Revenge-porn sites are increasingly common, making it easy for 
individuals to post explicit images or videos on the web.21  Jacobs’s 
research found that 22.1% of heterosexual respondents, and 23.3% of 
LGBT respondents, had been the victims of some form of nonconsensual 
 
 16. As of the date of this publication, the North Carolina General Assembly is 
considering a bill that would address many of these concerns, but it is unclear whether that 
bill will ever become law.  See H.B. 792, 2015 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2015), 
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015/Bills/House/PDF/H792v2.pdf.  In its current form, the 
bill would criminalize acts of revenge porn and would even provide a civil action for its 
victims.  See id. (proposing amendments to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.5A (2013)).  Passing 
this bill would be a large step in the right direction for filling the current gap in privacy 
protections in North Carolina, and serves as an indication that the precedent established by 
Hall v. Post should be reconsidered. 
 17. Derek E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025, 2027 (2014) (first citing E-
mail from Holly Jacobs to Derek E. Bambauer (June 28, 2013); then citing Holly Jacobs, An 
Examination of Psychological Meaningfulness, Safety, and Availability as the Underlying 
Mechanisms Linking Job Features and Personal Characteristics to Work Engagement (June 
5, 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida International University), 
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2023&context=etd). 
 18. Alexandra Marks, Charges Against “Sexting” Teenagers Highlight Legal Gaps, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/Innovation/Responsible- 
Tech/2009/0330/charges-against-sexting-teenagers-highlight-legal-gaps. 
 19. Julie Baumgardner, Teen Pregnancy Prevention, FIRST THINGS FIRST, http:// 
firstthings.org/teen-pregnancy-prevention-1 (last visited Apr. 29, 2015). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Memphis Barker, “Revenge Porn” Is No Longer a Niche Activity Which Victimises 
Only Celebrities—The Law Must Intervene, INDEPENDENT (May 19, 2013), http:// 
www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/revenge-porn-is-no-longer-a-niche-activity-which 
-victimises-only-celebrities--the-law-must-intervene-8622574.html. 
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distribution.22  People increasingly share nude or sexually explicit photos or 
videos with their partners.  And those partners increasingly break that trust 
by sharing the photos or videos online. 
Victims of revenge porn are susceptible to a number of harms.23  In 
some cases, victims have “lost jobs, been forced to change schools, 
changed their names, and have been subjected to real-life stalking and 
harassment because of the actions of those who posted and distributed their 
images.”24  Some victims have gone as far as committing suicide.25  It is 
common for victims to also experience a lost sense of security, a loss of 
personal dignity, feelings of shame in their dealings with family and 
friends, and challenges in keeping or securing future romantic 
relationships.26 
In most states,27 victims of revenge porn can sue the individual who 
uploads sexually explicit content under the tort of public disclosure of 
 
 22. Bambauer, supra note 17, at 2027–28. 
 23. Mary Anne Franks, Adventures in Victim Blaming: Revenge Porn Edition, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Feb. 1, 2013), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/02/ 
adventures-in-victim-blaming-revenge-porn-edition.html. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Forty-one states and the District of Columbia recognize an invasion-of-privacy 
action for the public disclosure of private facts.  See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 638 So. 2d 826, 828 
(Ala. 1994); Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Alaska 1989); 
Rutledge v. Phx. Newspapers, Inc., 715 P.2d 1243, 1245–46 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Dunlap 
v. McCarty, 678 S.W.2d 361, 363–64 (Ark. 1984); Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
865 P.2d 633, 647 (Cal. 1994); Lindemuth v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 765 P.2d 1057, 
1059 (Colo. App. 1988); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-Am., Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 
1329 (Conn. 1982); Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1349 (Del. 1992); Wolf v. Regardie, 
553 A.2d 1213, 1217 (D.C. 1989); Cape Publ’ns, Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1377 
(Fla. 1989); Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 493–94 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1994); Mehau v. Reed, 869 P.2d 1320, 1330 (Haw. 1994); Baker v. Burlington N., Inc., 587 
P.2d 829, 832–33 (Idaho 1978); Beverly v. Reinert, 606 N.E.2d 621, 624–25 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1993); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 298 (Iowa 1979); 
Werner v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250, 1256–57 (Kan. 1985); Wheeler v. P. Sorensen Mfg. Co., 
415 S.W.2d 582, 584–85 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967); Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So. 
2d 1386, 1388–90 (La. 1979); Loe v. Town of Thomaston, 600 A.2d 1090, 1093 (Me. 
1991); Arroyo v. Rosen, 648 A.2d 1074, 1080–81 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); Bratt v. Int’l 
Bus. Machs. Corp., 467 N.E.2d 126, 136–38 (Mass. 1984); Beaumont v. Brown, 257 
N.W.2d 522, 531–32 (Mich. 1977), overruled on other grounds by Bradley v. Bd. of Educ., 
565 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1997); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn. 
1998); Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378, 381–82 (Miss. 1990); Childs v. Williams, 825 
S.W.2d 4, 7–8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); State Bd. of Dentistry v. Kandarian, 886 P.2d 954, 
957–58 (Mont. 1995); Montesano v. Donrey Media Grp., 668 P.2d 1081, 1084–85 (Nev. 
1983); Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 240–41 (N.H. 1964); Gallo v. Princeton 
5
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private facts (the public-disclosure tort).28  Because section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act29 immunizes web hosts and other interactive 
computer services from most third-party tort liability, the tort provides 
victims with a civil remedy against the uploader for the publication of their 
private, but true, information.30  This remedy is not available to victims of 
revenge porn in North Carolina. 
With the rise of revenge porn, the time is ripe for North Carolina to 
reconsider the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s 1988 decision in Hall v. 
Post, which withheld privacy protections from citizens offered by the 
public-disclosure tort.31  This Comment makes the case for recognition of 
 
Univ., 656 A.2d 1267, 1276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Moore v. Sun Publ’g Corp., 
881 P.2d 735, 743 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); Hobbs v. Lopez, 645 N.E.2d 1261, 1263 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1994); Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766, 782 (Okla. 1989); Anderson v. Fisher 
Broad. Cos., 712 P.2d 803, 807–09 (Or. 1986); Marks v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 331 A.2d 424, 
430–31 (Pa. 1975); Todd v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 278 S.E.2d 607, 610 (S.C. 
1981); Dunn v. Moto Photo, Inc., 828 S.W.2d 747, 754–55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); Star-
Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473–74 (Tex. 1995); Lemnah v. Am. Breeders 
Serv., Inc., 482 A.2d 700, 703–04 (Vt. 1984); Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 580 P.2d 246, 253–54 
(Wash. 1978); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 81–86 (W. Va. 1984); 
Hillman v. Columbia County, 474 N.W.2d 913, 919–20 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991). 
  The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected the privacy tort in 1909.  See Henry v. 
Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 109 (1909), superseded by statute, Act of May 16, 1980, ch. 403, 
1980 R.I. Pub. Laws 1565 (codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (2012)).  All four 
branches of the privacy tort are now codified in Rhode Island.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 9-1-28.1. 
  Four states, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming, have suggested in 
related cases that they might recognize the tort of public disclosure of private facts.  See 
Tehven v. Job Serv. N.D., 488 N.W.2d 48, 51 (N.D. 1992); Ward v. Shope, 286 N.W.2d 
806, 808–09 (S.D. 1979); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563–64 (Utah 1988); Houghton v. 
Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050, 1055–56 (Wyo. 1994). 
  Only four states other than North Carolina, Indiana, Nebraska, New York, and 
Virginia, have expressly rejected an invasion of privacy action for the public disclosure of 
private facts.  See, e.g., Evans v. Sturgill, 430 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (W.D. Va. 1977); Doe v. 
Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 693 (Ind. 1997); Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 73 
N.W.2d 803, 806–07 (Neb. 1955); Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 704 (N.Y. 
1993) (acknowledging, however, that New York recognizes a right to privacy by statute). 
 28. See Amanda Levendowski, Note, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn, 3 
N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422, 434 n.60 (2014).  
 29. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 30. Id.; see also David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An 
Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373 (2010).  Anupam Chander argues for increased use 
of the public-disclosure tort to combat the rise of revenge porn.  See Anupam Chander, 
Youthful Indiscretion in an Internet Age, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, 
AND REPUTATION 124, 129–33 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010). 
 31. Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 713 (N.C. 1988). 
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this tort in four parts.  Part I offers background, discussing Hall v. Post and 
the court’s reasons for rejecting the public-disclosure tort.  Part II illustrates 
North Carolina’s gap in privacy protection and why recognition of the tort 
would help fill the gap.  Part III recommends the manner in which North 
Carolina should adopt and apply the public-disclosure tort to address 
revenge porn and other digital injuries. Finally, Part IV addresses the First 
Amendment concerns associated with recognition of the tort. 
I. HALL V. POST AND THE REJECTION OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE  
OF PRIVATE FACTS 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected the public disclosure of 
private facts as a cause of action in its 1988 decision, Hall v. Post.32  The 
plaintiffs in the case—Susie Hall and her adoptive mother, Mary Hall—
sued the Salisbury Post for publishing two separate articles.33  The first 
article concerned Lee and Aledith Gottschalk’s search for Aledith’s 
daughter, whom she had abandoned seventeen years prior.34  The article 
described Aledith’s former marriage to a carnival barker, the birth of their 
daughter, and the abandonment of the child.35 
After the Salisbury Post published the first article, the Gottschalks 
received calls at their motel informing them that the child described was 
plaintiff Susie Hall, and providing her whereabouts.36  The Salisbury Post 
subsequently published a second article identifying the child as Susie Hall 
and her adoptive mother as Mary Hall.37  This article also described the 
details and emotions of a telephone conversation between the Gottschalks 
and Susie Hall.38  The Halls alleged that the second publication had caused 
them to flee their home to avoid public attention and to seek and receive 
psychiatric treatment for the emotional and mental distress caused by the 
incident.39 
Without specifically addressing the facts of the case, the court 
continued the trend it had set when it rejected the tort of false light a few 
years earlier40 by similarly rejecting public disclosure of private facts.41  
 
 32. Id. at 714. 
 33. Id. at 712. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Renwick v. News & Observer Publ’g Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 413 (N.C. 1984). 
 41. Hall, 372 S.E.2d at 717. 
7
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The court outlined two primary reasons for rejecting the cause of action.  
First, it found the public disclosure of private facts to be “constitutionally 
suspect” because it added to the tension between tort law and the First 
Amendment.42  Second, it believed recognition of public disclosure of 
private facts would duplicate other causes of action, such as the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.43 
Justice Frye, in a concurring opinion, argued that the plaintiffs should 
not recover for public disclosure of private facts because the information 
was of legitimate public concern, but he disagreed with the court’s decision 
to totally deny recognition of the tort.44  Justice Frye acknowledged that 
courts have struggled with the tension between the freedom of the press to 
disseminate information to the public and an individual’s right to privacy.45  
Nonetheless, he emphasized that “neither the constitutional right of 
freedom of the press nor the right to be free from publicity [were] 
absolute.”46  Justice Frye concluded that the resolution of the conflicting 
rights lies in the “application of a ‘newsworthiness’ or ‘public interest’ 
standard in determining what publications are constitutionally privileged 
and what publications are actionable.”47 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision not to recognize the 
public-disclosure tort was exceptional.48  The court granted far more 
 
 42. Id. at 716. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 717–18 (Frye, J., concurring).  Justice Frye wrote: 
I do not accept the notion that the tension already existing between the first 
amendment and the law of torts requires the non-recognition of a legitimate claim 
by a non-public figure against a media defendant for wrongfully publishing highly 
offensive private facts which are not of legitimate concern to the public. 
Id. at 717. 
 45. Id. at 719 (first citing Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); then citing 
Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981); then citing Virgil v. Time, Inc., 
527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975); then citing Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34 
(Cal. 1971), overruled on other grounds by Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 
552, 560 (Cal. 2004); and then citing Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publ’g Co., 326 So. 2d 471 
(Miss. 1976)). 
 46. Id. at 719. 
 47. Id. at 720 (quoting Hall v. Post, 355 S.E.2d 819, 824 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987), rev’d, 
372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988)). 
 48. See, e.g., Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 73 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Neb. 1955) 
(deferring to the legislature to decide whether a private-facts claim should be recognized); 
Arrington v. N.Y. Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1323 (N.Y. 1982) (noting that, assuming 
privacy actions were recognized, the publication of the plaintiff’s photograph in an article 
about middle-class African Americans did not support a claim because “an inability to 
vindicate a personal predelection [sic] for greater privacy may be part of the price every 
person must be prepared to pay for a society in which information and opinion flow 
8
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sweeping protection to truthful speech than the Supreme Court of the 
United States has held the Constitution to require.49  In fact, one year after 
Hall, the Supreme Court of the United States cautioned against such 
sweeping decisions: “We continue to believe that the sensitivity and 
significance of the interests presented in clashes between the First 
Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that 
sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.”50  
Unfortunately, the court’s decision in Hall was sweeping, leaving North 
Carolina with a rule that was as unnecessary as it was unprecedented.  Only 
four other states have declined to recognize the public-disclosure tort.51 
A lot has changed since the state’s highest court rejected the public-
disclosure tort.52  Today, twenty-first-century technologies magnify the 
harm suffered by victims of these public disclosures.  Technology has 
made the publication of personal information easier and more 
commonplace, and has exacerbated the emotional, reputational, economic, 
and professional injuries associated with the unwanted publication of 
private information. 
In 1988, when Hall was decided, publications were made by 
professional media sources, and news was spread primarily by word of 
mouth, telephone, newspaper, or television.  News or publishing 
intermediaries “played an important social role in balancing the 
newsworthiness of information against the privacy interests of third parties 
who were identified.”53  Today, Internet technologies have provided a 
 
freely”); Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 272 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1954) 
(declining to extend a statutory provision for commercial misappropriation to allow a claim 
of misappropriation of an entertainer’s life story in a movie).  The Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island rejected the privacy tort in 1909.  See Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 73 A. 97, 109 (R.I. 
1909).  However, as mentioned above, that decision was superseded by a statute that granted 
a cause of action for all four branches of the privacy tort.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 
(2012); see also Lucy Noble Inman, Note, Hall v. Post: North Carolina Rejects Claim of 
Invasion of Privacy by Truthful Publication of Embarrassing Facts, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1474, 
1487 n.131 (1989). 
 49. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989) (expressly resolving government 
sanctions of true information only as it arose “in a discrete factual context”). 
 50. Id. at 533. 
 51. See Evans v. Sturgill, 430 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (W.D. Va. 1977); Doe v. Methodist 
Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 693 (Ind. 1997); Brunson, 73 N.W.2d at 806–07 (deferring to the 
legislature to decide whether a private-facts claim should be recognized); Howell v. N.Y. 
Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699, 704 (N.Y. 1993) (acknowledging, however, that New York 
recognizes a statutory right to privacy); see also supra note 27. 
 52. In 1995, only about 10% of adults used the Internet.  Kathryn Zickuhr & Aaron 
Smith, Digital Differences, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
2012/04/13/digital-differences/. 
 53. Id. 
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“technological megaphone” that individuals can use to “broadcast their 
story [and those of others] to the world.”54 
Use of technology and social media is growing.  Internet use among 
American adults from 1995 to 2014 has increased from 14% to 87%.55  
Today, Facebook has over 1.44 billion monthly active users and 936 
million daily active users, with 161 million daily active users in the United 
States and Canada alone.56  Facebook users have uploaded over 250 billion 
photos, and average 4.5 billion “likes” each day.57  There are 302 million 
monthly active Twitter users, with 500 million Tweets sent per day.58  
Further, a majority of Americans now own smartphones that provide 
instant access to the Internet and social media.59 
The growth of revenge porn in the United States is directly related to 
the growth in technology and the use of social media.  This has, in turn, 
created a need for legal remedies to address digital injuries.  The public-
disclosure tort provides a civil remedy to address these injuries.60 
II. NORTH CAROLINA’S GAP IN PRIVACY PROTECTION 
The Court’s decision in Hall v. Post has created a gap in privacy 
protection in North Carolina that is increasingly problematic with the rise 
of revenge porn and other digital injuries.  This Part highlights the gap in 
protection by examining how the various civil remedies available to 
citizens of North Carolina fail to adequately redress the publication of 
private images commonly associated with revenge porn. 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Internet Use Over Time, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/ 
internet-use/internet-use-over-time/ (last visited May 11, 2015). 
 56. Craig Smith, By the Numbers: 200+ Amazing Facebook User Statistics, DMR (last 
updated May 11, 2015), http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/by-the-numbers-17-
amazing-facebook-stats/#.VDV03fl4pcQ. 
 57. Id. 
 58. About, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/company (last visited May 11, 2015).  
From 2011 to 2013 alone, Twitter acquired 280 million active users—an increase of 40%.  
TJ McCue, Twitter Ranked Fastest Growing Social Platform in the World, FORBES (Jan. 29, 
2013, 4:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2013/01/29/twitter-ranked-fastest- 
growing-social-platform-in-the-world/.  
 59. Aaron Smith, Nearly Half of American Adults Are Smartphone Owners, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/Smartphone-Update-2012. 
aspx. 
 60. See Chander, supra note 30, at 129–33 (arguing that the public-disclosure tort is the 
best legal remedy to address the rise of revenge porn). 
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A. Privacy Torts 
Privacy torts could provide revenge-porn victims with valuable civil 
remedies against the individual who publishes their private images, but 
privacy torts are not fully recognized in North Carolina.61 
Privacy torts grew out of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 
famous 1890 article, The Right to Privacy.62  Warren and Brandeis believed 
that privacy had become more essential to individuals because the press of 
their day was subjecting individuals to “mental pain and distress, far 
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”63  By synthesizing 
cases in which relief had been granted “on the basis of defamation, or the 
invasion of some property right, or a breach of confidence or an implied 
contract,”64 they concluded that these decisions were based on a distinct 
right to privacy, deserving of its own “separate recognition.”65  They 
wanted the law to adapt to the needs of society, recognizing that the 
strength of our legal system lies in its adaptability, capacity for growth, and 
ability “to meet the wants of an ever changing society and to apply 
immediate relief for every recognized wrong.”66 
In subsequent decades, courts were divided over recognition of 
Warren and Brandeis’s right to privacy.  With the publication of the 
Restatement of Torts in 1939, however, the momentum substantially shifted 
in favor of recognizing privacy rights.67   
After Warren and Brandeis introduced the vague notion of the right to 
privacy, William Prosser organized the idea into a classification of four 
torts.68  Prosser asserted that the four privacy torts—intrusion, false light, 
appropriation, and public disclosure of private facts—shared very little 
 
 61. See Burgess v. Busby, 544 S.E.2d 4, 11 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (indicating that North 
Carolina does not recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy by disclosure of 
private facts or false light); accord Broughton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 588 S.E.2d 
20, 27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003). 
 62. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 63. Id. at 196. 
 64. Prosser, supra note 1, at 384 (citations omitted) (discussing Warren and Brandeis’s 
article). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 62, at 213 n.1. 
 67. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
 68. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 149 (2007). 
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apart from an interference with a plaintiff’s right “to be let alone,” because 
each tort protected a different interest of the plaintiff.69 
North Carolina narrowly recognizes only two of the four privacy torts: 
appropriation and intrusion upon seclusion.70  Neither of these two privacy 
torts is adequate to address the injuries of revenge-porn victims in the state. 
1. Intrusion Upon Seclusion 
Intrusion is ill suited for addressing most injuries resulting from 
revenge porn.71  The claim of intrusion protects against the acquisition of 
private information when one intrudes “upon the solitude or seclusion of 
another or his private affairs or concerns” if the intrusion is “highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.”72  Intrusion protects against the invasion 
of one’s private, physical space and from methods of wiretapping and 
eavesdropping.73  The plaintiff’s interest protected by intrusion, Prosser 
argued, was primarily a “mental one” that had been useful for filling the 
gaps between trespass, nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and other constitutional remedies.74 
The classic case of intrusion involves the “Peeping Tom,” who 
records or views someone in a private place without that person’s 
knowledge.  In Hamberger v. Eastman,75 for example, the court concluded 
that a couple had a valid intrusion claim against their landlord for his 
installation of a hidden recording device in their bedroom.76 
 
 69. Prosser, supra note 1, at 389.  This phrase was originally coined by Judge Cooley 
and used by Warren and Brandeis in The Right to Privacy.  See Warren & Brandeis, supra 
note 62, at 95. 
 70. See Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350, 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (acknowledging 
that North Carolina has recognized the privacy torts of appropriation and intrusion upon 
seclusion).  But see Hall, 372 S.E.2d at 713 (rejecting the tort of public disclosure of private 
facts in 1988); Renwick v. News & Observer Publ’g Co., 312 S.E.2d 405 (N.C. 1984) 
(rejecting the false-light tort in 1984). 
 71. See Broughton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 588 S.E.2d 20, 27–28 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2003) (indicating that there must be a physical or sensory intrusion or an unauthorized 
prying into confidential personal records to support a claim for invasion of privacy by 
intrusion). 
 72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 73. Prosser, supra note 1, at 389–92. 
 74. Id. at 392. 
 75. Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964). 
 76. Id. at 241–42; see also Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1431 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
(finding media surveillance of a couple’s activities in their home to be actionable under an 
intrusion tort theory); Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. 1931) (holding that 
wiretapping a person’s phone gives rise to a tort action because it violates his right “to the 
privacy of his home as against the unwarranted invasion of others”). 
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Intrusion, by definition, does not protect anyone who consents to the 
initial acquisition of his or her private information, even if that information 
is later disclosed to the public without the person’s consent.  This presents 
a legal barrier for most revenge-porn victims, the majority of whom 
consensually give private images to a boyfriend or girlfriend, trusting that 
those images will be kept private.  Victims of revenge porn are injured 
when those images are subsequently disclosed to a broader audience 
without their permission.  Thus, intrusion does not protect revenge-porn 
victims like Holly Jacobs, and it would not protect the North Carolina 
teenagers harmed by the recent disclosure of their private images if those 
teenagers initially gave those images to a boyfriend or girlfriend in trust.77 
2. Appropriation of One’s Name or Likeness 
Because of North Carolina’s narrow interpretation of the appropriation 
tort, it, too, is ill suited as a remedy for victims of revenge porn.  In 
Prosser’s view, appropriation was unlike the other three privacy torts in 
that it protected the plaintiff’s proprietary interest in his or her identity—a 
plaintiff’s “name or likeness.”78  As appropriation has developed, courts 
have taken two distinct views on what the tort protects.79  The first view, 
which was also adopted by Prosser, is that appropriation protects a property 
right.80  This view has been more widely adopted.81  The second view is 
that appropriation protects against embarrassment or loss of dignity.82 
 
 77. Intrusion could be a remedy for any of the North Carolina teenagers whose accounts 
were hacked and who had not disclosed images to someone in trust.  But see Rowan Co. 
Student, supra note 13 (highlighting that some of the victims initially shared these images 
with boyfriends or girlfriends before they were disclosed on Instagram and Twitter). 
 78. Prosser, supra note 1, at 406. 
 79. See Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and 
Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647, 663–70 (1991) (contrasting the “property” and 
“dignity” rationales that underlie the tort of appropriation). 
 80. Jonathan Kahn, Bringing Dignity Back to Light: Publicity Rights and the Eclipse of 
the Tort of Appropriation of Identity, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 223–24 (1999).  
Some states have adopted a new tort known as the “right of publicity” to redress violations 
of property rights to one’s name or likeness.  See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF 
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.63, at 544–45 (2d ed. 2014) (“Simplistically put, while the 
appropriation branch of the right of privacy is invaded by an injury to the psyche, the right 
of publicity is infringed by an injury to the pocketbook.”). 
 81. See Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort 
Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 109–14 (2003) (arguing that 
Prosser’s characterization of appropriation as vindicating property interests obscured the 
dignitary interests that the tort protected, noting that “[m]odern courts are prone to 
subsuming the privacy claim under the label of publicity”). 
 82. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 986–89 (1964). 
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North Carolina has adopted a narrow interpretation of the first view,83 
allowing recovery only in situations where the defendant uses the 
plaintiff’s name or likeness for advertising or commercial purposes.84  
Thus, any disclosures of sexual photographs that are not made for 
advertising or commercial purposes would not fall within North Carolina’s 
definition of appropriation. This approach is problematic for victims of 
revenge porn, whose images or videos are typically published to cause 
harm or embarrassment, not for some advertising or commercial use.85 
B. Other Common-Law Remedies 
North Carolina common law provides some narrow categorical 
protections against the disclosure of confidential medical information 
through medical-malpractice actions;86 and, where a fiduciary duty exists, 
North Carolina allows plaintiffs to recover for the breach of a fiduciary 
duty.87  These categorical protections, however, do nothing for revenge-
porn victims, because their injuries do not involve the disclosure of medical 
information or the existence of a fiduciary duty. 
 
 83. The Restatement (Second) of Torts takes a broader approach to appropriation, 
allowing for recovery where the defendant appropriates the plaintiff’s name or likeness for 
her own “use or benefit.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 84. See Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 64 (N.C. 1938) (concluding that 
the unauthorized use of one’s photograph in connection with an advertisement or other 
commercial purpose gives rise to a cause of action for appropriation); Merritt, Flebotte, 
Wilson, Webb & Caruso, PLLC v. Hemmings, 676 S.E.2d 79, 89 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) 
(noting that the defendant must show that the misappropriation was made for commercial 
purposes (citing Autotech Techs. Ltd. P’ship v. Automationdirect.com, Inc., No. 05C5488, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29082, at *11 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2006), aff’d, 471 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 
2006))). 
 85. See William K. Smith, Saving Face: Adopting a Right of Publicity to Protect North 
Carolinians in an Increasingly Digital World, 92 N.C. L. REV. 2065, 2098 n.227 (2014) 
(discussing how this lack of protection is increasingly problematic as cyberbullying and 
revenge porn become more commonplace). 
 86. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (2013) (“Confidential information obtained in medical 
records shall be furnished only on the authorization of the patient. . . .”); see also Watts v. 
Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. 330 S.E.2d 242, 249 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Mazza 
v. Huffaker, 300 S.E.2d 833, 837–38 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)), rev’d in part on other grounds, 
345 S.E.2d 201 (N.C. 1986). 
 87. See White v. Consol. Planning, Inc., 603 S.E.2d 147, 155–56 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) 
(explaining that breach of fiduciary duty is a recognized tort in North Carolina that requires 
the existence of a fiduciary relationship (citing Abbitt v. Gregory, 160 S.E. 896, 906 (N.C. 
1931))). 
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North Carolina recognizes defamation as a cause of action, but the tort 
covers only the publication of false information, not true facts.88  Since 
images or videos of victims of revenge porn are true images, defamation is 
not an appropriate claim.  Defamation protects an important reputational 
interest, but it does not protect the vast amounts of true, private information 
that, when disclosed to the public, can be extremely harmful as well. 
Contrary to the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s assessment in 
Hall, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)89 does not serve as 
an adequate proxy for public disclosure of private facts for victims of 
revenge porn.  To state a prima facie cause of action for IIED in North 
Carolina, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) extreme and outrageous 
conduct, (2) which is intended to cause and does cause (3) severe emotional 
distress to another.90 
North Carolina’s interpretation of these elements makes it difficult for 
revenge-porn victims to find relief under the tort of IIED.  First, the 
revenge-porn victim must prove that the defendant’s publication of the 
media constitutes “extreme and outrageous conduct.”91  In North Carolina, 
conduct is extreme and outrageous when it exceeds all bounds usually 
tolerated by a decent society92 or shocks the conscience.93  Liability does 
not extend to mere insults, indignities, or threats.94  Comparably, public 
disclosure of private facts generally requires only proof that the defendant 
(1) published private facts (2) that would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.  The conduct threshold for IIED is therefore higher than 
 
 88. Holleman v. Aiken, 668 S.E.2d 579, 587–88 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that a 
statement’s truth is an absolute defense to a libel claim (citing Martin Marietta Corp. v. 
Wake Stone Corp., 432 S.E.2d 428, 433 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), aff’d per curiam, 453 S.E.2d 
146 (N.C. 1995))). 
 89. See Shreve v. Duke Power Co., 354 S.E.2d 357, 359 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (defining 
IIED under North Carolina law). 
 90. Dickens v. Puryear, 276 S.E.2d 325, 335 (N.C. 1981). 
 91. See, e.g., Ausley v. Bishop, 515 S.E.2d 72, 79 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that 
the claimant’s burden in demonstrating extreme and outrageous conduct is high); Shreve, 
354 S.E.2d at 359–60 (finding that the defendant’s conduct did not rise to the level of 
extreme and outrageous). 
 92. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Conroy, 567 S.E.2d 403, 408 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Phillips v. 
Rest. Mgmt. of Carolina, L.P., 552 S.E.2d 686, 693 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Shreve, 
354 S.E.2d at 359). 
 93. See, e.g., Dunn v. Mosley, No. 4:10-CV-28-FL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65279, at 
*16 (E.D.N.C. June 16, 2011) (citing Russ v. Causey, 732 F. Supp. 2d 589, 607 (E.D.N.C. 
2010), aff’d in part, 468 F. App’x 267 (4th Cir. 2012)). 
 94. See, e.g., McEntire v. Johnson, No. 1:12cv327, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151482, at 
*7–8 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2013) (citing Guthrie, 567 S.E.2d at 408–09). 
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the public-disclosure tort, making it more difficult for a victim of revenge 
porn to recover under IIED. 
In addition, a plaintiff must prove that the extreme and outrageous 
conduct caused her “severe emotional distress.”95  In North Carolina, this is 
defined as “neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other 
type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be 
generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.”96  
Temporary fright, disappointment, or regret will not satisfy this element, 
nor will feelings of fear, embarrassment, and humiliation.97  Therefore, 
even if a victim can prove extreme and outrageous conduct, she may fail to 
meet the high threshold of proving severe emotional distress.  Many 
victims of revenge porn may suffer only from embarrassment and 
humiliation, which would not satisfy this element.  Conversely, disclosure 
of private information can cause other types of harm—such as financial or 
professional harm—that may not be adequately addressed by IIED.98  The 
efficacy of public disclosure of private facts is that it specifically deters the 
disclosure of private information; IIED is not specifically designed to deter 
this behavior. 
Moreover, no public figure can recover for IIED that arises out of a 
publication without proving falsity.99  Thus, no matter how offensive or 
harmful the disclosure, a public figure will never recover for IIED if the 
information disclosed is true, which will nearly always be the case for 
victims of revenge porn. 
The common-law remedies available to victims of revenge porn are 
inadequate in North Carolina, and the state’s limited recognition of privacy 
torts leaves victims with no common-law remedy to address their injuries. 
 
 95. Waddle v. Sparks, 414 S.E.2d 22, 27 (N.C. 1992) (quoting Dickens, 276 S.E.2d at 
335). 
 96. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 395 S.E.2d 
85, 97 (N.C. 1990)). 
 97. Payne v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 705, 710 (E.D.N.C. 2011) 
(quoting Kaplan v. Prolife Action League of Greensboro, 431 S.E.2d 828, 837–38 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1993)), aff’d, 471 F. App’x 186 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 98. See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 
1815–16 (2010) (discussing the financial and economic damages that can result from the 
unwanted disclosure of private information). 
 99. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). 
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C. Other Statutory Remedies 
Civil remedies available by statute in North Carolina also fall short of 
addressing injuries caused by revenge porn.100  North Carolina’s categorical 
approach to addressing issues related to individual privacy leaves gaps in 
protection for revenge-porn victims. 
Several federal and state statutes limit disclosure of personal data.  
Federal statutes restrict disclosure of information from school records,101 
cable company records,102 video rental or sale records,103 driving records,104 
and health records.105  In addition, the Fair Credit Reporting Act places 
limitations on consumer reporting agencies’ disclosures of consumer 
reports.106 
Many states also provide statutory privacy protections against the 
disclosure of personal information.  Thirty states have statutes that prohibit 
the disclosure of identifying information concerning victims of sexual 
crimes.107  Forty-one states restrict the disclosure of identifying information 
regarding an individual’s HIV or AIDS status.108  North Carolina does not 
have statutes addressing the victims of sexual crimes or disclosure of 
information regarding HIV or AIDS.  North Carolina does, however, have 
a statute that protects against the disclosure of some personal information 
where the person has previously objected to the disclosure of that 
information. 109 
North Carolina applies what one author has called the “Stratified 
Model” to statutory privacy protections,110 basing the degree of protection 
 
 100. But see supra note 16 (discussing proposed legislation that would cover many of the 
injuries associated with revenge porn). 
 101. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g(b) (2012). 
 102. Cable Communication Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551(c). 
 103. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710–2711. 
 104. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725. 
 105. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 106. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3). 
 107. For a full list of these statutes, see Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy’s 
Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 425, 433 n.40 
(1996). 
 108. See id. at 434 n.41. 
 109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-66 (2013). 
 110. See Bruce D. Goldstein, Comment, Confidentiality and Dissemination of Personal 
Information: An Examination of State Laws Governing Data Protection, 41 EMORY L.J. 
1185, 1191–92 (1992). 
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on the content of the information.111  As such, North Carolina limits the 
disclosure of information obtained through the collection of taxes on 
controlled substances112 and privileged patient medical records.113  North 
Carolina also prohibits employment discrimination against anyone testing 
positive for AIDS,114 and the disclosure of “trade secrets.”115  Indeed, these 
categorical protections are important, but they protect only against 
disclosures by government agencies and only the types of information 
listed in the statutes, leaving a wide gap that does not protect against the 
disclosure of nude or sexual images. 
On the criminal side, North Carolina provides little protection against 
the public disclosure of private information.  North Carolina has 
surprisingly robust—some argue, unconstitutional116—protections against 
cyberbullying,117 where students are prohibited from making even true 
statements, if those statements might provoke a third party to “stalk or 
harass a school employee.”118  North Carolina’s cyberbullying statutes, 
however, only protect teachers and students, and there is no evidence of 
any prosecutions under these statutes.  North Carolina does prohibit 
identity theft,119 but the law’s focus is on punishing the conduct of stealing 
one’s identity, not deterring those who may have disclosed personal 
information to the identity thief.  Further, criminal laws generally focus on 
vindicating the state’s interests in deterring crime,120 not on making “the 
injured person whole.”121 
In sum, although North Carolina has many common-law and statutory 
remedies, there is no legal protection that directly addresses the harm that 
 
 111. Id. at 1191. 
 112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-113.112. 
 113. Id. § 130A-12. 
 114. Id. § 130A-148(i). 
 115. Id. § 132-1.2; see also id. § 66-152 (defining trade secrets). 
 116. See James L. Seay III, Comment, Salvaging the North Carolina Teacher-
Cyberbullying Statute, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 391, 397–411 (2015) (arguing that portions of 
the state’s cyberbullying statutes violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Olivia A. 
Weil, Note, Preserving the Schoolhouse Gates: An Analytical Framework For Curtailing 
Cyberbullying Without Eroding Students’ Constitutional Rights, 11 AVE MARIA L. REV. 541, 
559 (2013) (acknowledging that the law is subject to attacks grounded in the overbreadth 
and vagueness doctrines). 
 117. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-458.1 to .2. 
 118. Id. § 14-458.2(b)(2). 
 119. Although North Carolina does not specifically punish the disclosure of information 
to an identity thief, the offender could be charged with identity theft in certain 
circumstances.  See id. § 14-113.20. 
 120. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 6 (2d ed. 2011). 
 121. Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 717 N.W.2d 258, 273 (Wis. 2006). 
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results from revenge porn in a way that fully replaces the public-disclosure 
tort. 
III. BRINGING THE PUBLIC-DISCLOSURE TORT ONLINE IN  
NORTH CAROLINA 
Recognizing a cause of action for the public disclosure of private facts 
in North Carolina will offer victims of revenge porn a civil remedy for the 
unauthorized publication of their private images.  Of the four privacy torts, 
the public-disclosure tort most closely addresses “the interest that 
motivated Warren and Brandeis to write their article,” because it targets the 
unwanted disclosure of private information.122  Warren and Brandeis were 
primarily concerned with the press invading the private lives of individuals 
and publishing private information with newspapers and new technology, 
such as “instantaneous photographs” and “mechanical devices,” to feed 
what they perceived to be society’s “prurient taste.”123  They argued that 
the common law’s “beautiful capacity for growth” allowed judges to 
respond to gaps in legal protection,124 and, as the “press [was] overstepping 
in every direction the obvious bound of propriety and of decency,” Warren 
and Brandeis believed that the common law should provide a remedy to 
protect individuals’ privacy interests.125 
Recognizing the public-disclosure tort would give victims of revenge 
porn a civil remedy for the harm caused by those disclosures.  North 
Carolina can either judicially126 or legislatively127 bring the public-
disclosure tort back to life.  Either way, the essence of the tort should 
provide that a plaintiff states a prima facie cause of action for the public 
disclosure of private facts if she proves each of the following elements: 
 
 
 
 122. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The “New” Privacy and the “Old”: Is Applying the 
Tort Law of Privacy Like Putting High-Button Shoes on the Internet?, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 
107, 112 (2012) [hereinafter Zimmerman, New Privacy]. 
 123. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 62, at 195–96. 
 124. Id. at 195. 
 125. Id. at 196–97. 
 126. Given the opportunity, the Supreme Court of North Carolina can reverse the Hall 
decision and recognize the tort of public disclosure of private facts.  The court could justify 
this decision by acknowledging the increasing need for privacy protection in the digital age 
to address injuries from actions like publishing revenge porn—a need that was not foreseen 
in 1988 when Hall was decided. 
 127. A second method to bring the public-disclosure tort to life in North Carolina is for 
the General Assembly to draft a civil statute granting the same protection. 
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(1) The defendant published information about the plaintiff; 
 
(2) Before this disclosure, the information was private (i.e., not 
known to the public); 
 
(3) The publication of this information would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person; and 
 
(4)  The information published was not of legitimate public 
concern.128 
 
When broken down, the tort requires proof of four distinct elements: 
(1) publicity, (2) private facts, (3) offensiveness, and (4) lack of a 
legitimate public concern.129  Each of these elements leaves some room for 
interpretation and flexibility,130 making public disclosure of private facts 
adaptable to changes in social norms and useful for addressing harms in the 
digital age.  This Part explains each of the elements and provides 
recommendations on how North Carolina should interpret and apply these 
elements to injuries like revenge porn in the digital age. 
A. Publicity   
First, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant published private 
information about the plaintiff.  To address this element, North Carolina 
should adopt a flexible approach that accounts for the rapid dissemination 
of information made possible by the Internet.  North Carolina ought to 
avoid the traditional view of “publicity,” which forecloses recovery in 
cases where information is disclosed to a small group of people, when that 
information is disclosed online. 
Most states require the plaintiff to show that her private information 
was communicated to the “public at large, or to so many persons that the 
matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public 
knowledge.”131  In these states, it is not necessary for everyone in that 
 
 128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 129. See id. § 652D cmts. b, d (addressing both private matters and matters of legitimate 
public concern). 
 130. See Jaime A. Madell, Note, The Poster’s Plight: Bringing the Public Disclosure 
Tort Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 895, 916 (2011). 
 131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (explaining the publicity element 
of the public-disclosure tort). 
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broad audience to recognize the person involved or to understand the 
significance of the disclosure.132 
Traditionally, the publicity element was not satisfied when 
information was disclosed to a single person, or even to a small group.133  
However, at least one court has found the use of e-mail to send sexually 
explicit photographs to a small number of family and friends to raise an 
issue of material fact as to whether the publicity element had been satisfied, 
acknowledging that the publicity element may be satisfied even when 
communicated to a small group if the information is sent over the Internet, 
because of the ease with which that information can be further 
disseminated.134  That court’s approach is effective in the digital age 
because it acknowledges how publications are more easily made on the 
Internet.  To address the “publicity” element in the digital age, courts 
should examine how easily the information can be further disseminated.  
Under this approach, information shared online, even to a small group, will 
likely satisfy the “publicity” element because it is so easily shared. 
It is now almost universally recognized that publication can be made 
through any medium.  This includes, but is not limited to, oral 
communications,135 radio broadcasts,136 movies,137 television,138 and 
photographs.139  Because courts have found these types of mediums 
sufficient to satisfy the publication element, any disclosures made by mass 
media, online social-networking sites, blogs, or mass e-mail should also be 
sufficient, since they can reach large audiences instantaneously. 
 
 132. See, e.g., Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., Miller & Rhoades, Inc., 492 
A.2d 580, 588 (D.C. 1985) (noting that the plaintiff was harmed when her image was 
broadcast on television in connection with her plastic surgery, even though her name was 
not mentioned and many viewers likely did not recognize her). 
 133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a. 
 134. Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90633, at *5–7 
(D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009). 
 135. See, e.g., Steinbuch v. Cutler, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2006) (applying District 
of Columbia law); Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 884–85 (S.D. Ga. 
1983) (applying Georgia law). 
 136. See, e.g., Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845, 845–46 (N.D. Cal. 1939); 
Wilson v. Grant, 687 A.2d 1009, 1015 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
 137. See, e.g., Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1341 (M.D. Fla. 
2002) (applying Florida law), aff’d, 425 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 138. See, e.g., Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1123–24 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
(applying California law). 
 139. See, e.g., McCabe v. Vill. Voice, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 525, 529 (E.D. Pa. 1982) 
(applying Pennsylvania law); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 477 (Ala. 
1964); Zieve v. Hairston, 598 S.E.2d 25, 30 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). 
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B. Private Facts 
Second, a plaintiff must prove that information published by the 
defendant constitutes “private facts.”  For this element, North Carolina 
should adopt an approach that recognizes that information is often 
disclosed to several trusted confidants with the expectation that the 
information will not be disseminated further.  Instead of viewing 
information disclosed to trusted individuals as now being public and 
therefore insufficient to meet the standard of “private facts,” courts ought 
to examine whether the information has been shared beyond these 
boundaries before finding that the information qualifies as “public.” 
The public-disclosure tort is designed to protect information that is 
truly private.140  Thus, there is no liability where the defendant merely 
gives further publicity to information that is already in the public record.141  
For example, publicity about the plaintiff’s date of birth, fact of marriage, 
military record, or a pleading filed in a lawsuit is not a private fact as a 
matter of law and is not actionable.142 
The Supreme Court of the United States validated the constitutionality 
of the public-records exception in 1975 in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Cohn.143  That case involved the father of a deceased rape victim who sued 
a broadcasting company because its reporter disclosed his daughter’s name 
during a report of the alleged rapist’s trial.144  The Court held that a state 
may not constitutionally impose sanctions for the accurate publication of a 
rape victim’s name obtained from the official court records when the 
records are maintained in connection with a criminal prosecution and are 
open to public inspection.145  In doing so, the Court reinforced the public-
records exception and emphasized that it does not matter whether the 
information is easily obtainable.146  However, “if the record is one not open 
to public inspection, [such as] income tax returns, it is not [considered] 
public, and there is an invasion of privacy when it is made so.”147 
The tort of public disclosure of private facts is premised on the idea 
that there are certain phases of a person’s life that he or she only wants 
revealed to those entrusted with that information.148  A few facts that have 
 
 140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. § 652D cmt. b. 
 143. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 476 (1975). 
 144. Id. at 474. 
 145. Id. at 495. 
 146. Id. at 496. 
 147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b. 
 148. Id. 
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been deemed private for purposes of this tort include financial 
information,149 debts,150 intimate parts of anatomy,151 sexual habits,152 and 
gender corrective surgery.153 
When addressing this element, the court should first address the 
public-records exception, as outlined in Cox Broadcasting.  Information 
that is available in the public record should not satisfy the element of 
“private facts.”  Second, the court should examine whether the information 
is being disclosed beyond “existing networks of information flow.”154  
Courts must not view “private facts” as a binary, all-or-nothing concept.  
Rather, courts ought to recognize degrees of privacy, a concept known as 
“limited privacy,”155 and not equate what is “secret” with what is 
 
 149. See, e.g., Yee Keung Siu v. Pius Lee, No. A116191, 2007 WL 2956360, at *7 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2007) (holding that the disclosure of “highly sensitive private financial 
information” amounted to a public disclosure of private facts); Mason v. Williams Disc. 
Ctr., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 836, 838–39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a “no checks” sign 
regarding the plaintiffs “interfered with [their] right to be let alone”). 
 150. See, e.g., Challen v. Town & Country Charge, 545 F. Supp. 1014, 1016 (N.D. Ill. 
1982) (applying Ohio and Illinois law); Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 148 S.W.2d 708, 
709 (Ky. 1941). 
 151. See, e.g., Banks v. King Features Syndicate, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 352, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 
1939) (holding that publishing x-rays of a woman’s pelvic region violated her right to 
privacy); Green v. Chi. Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d 249, 251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (alleging that 
a newspaper published a mother’s statements to her dead son and photographs showing her 
son’s body in the hospital); see also Briceño v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 911 So. 2d 176, 178, 
181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (deciding that the plaintiff’s claim “that Sprint employees 
asked for her password and, upon accessing her e-mail account, obtained and disseminated 
personal photographs of her body to third persons via the internet” was arbitrable under a 
cellular telephone service agreement). 
 152. See, e.g., Nat’l Bonding Agency v. Demeson, 648 S.W.2d 748, 749 n.1 (Tex. App. 
1983), abrogated on other grounds by Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994); 
see also Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 827 (C.D. Cal. 1998).  In 
Michaels, the court found that a famous rock star’s and actress’s privacy rights were 
violated by the distribution of videos of the couple engaging in sexual intercourse, even 
though the actress routinely portrayed sexy characters, and even though another tape of her 
having sex with her husband had previously been distributed.  Id.  Similarly, the degree to 
which the rock star opened his life to the public did not extend to the publicizing of his 
sexual acts.  Id. 
 153. See, e.g., Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771 (Ct. App. 1983). 
 154. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 535 (2006) 
[hereinafter Solove, Taxonomy]; see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory 
of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 974 (2005) (arguing that an individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy where there is a low risk that the information will spread beyond the 
individual’s social network). 
 155. Strahilevitz, supra note 154, at 939. 
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“private.”156  Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach157 illustrates the 
concept of “limited privacy.”  Kubach was an HIV-positive man who had 
disclosed his HIV diagnosis to his family and to “friends, medical 
personnel and members of his AIDS support group.”158  He agreed to 
appear on a local television broadcast to discuss AIDS, and as a condition 
for doing the interview, he was assured that his face would not be visible 
on television.159  Kubach sued the station upon discovering that his face 
was visible to viewers during the interview, and the station’s defense was 
that Kubach had previously disclosed to others that he was HIV-positive.160  
The court disagreed, finding that Kubach had disclosed this information to 
people who “cared about him . . . or because they also had AIDS.”161 
Courts in North Carolina should adopt this approach of “limited 
privacy.”  The ultimate question in this analysis is whether information is 
confined within expected boundaries of privacy.  In the case of Kubach, 
this meant that information was confined to those he trusted and was 
therefore still private.  The concept of limited privacy allows victims of 
revenge porn a greater chance at recovery.  Such victims initially share 
their information with one individual, but, to them, the information is still 
private.  They have a reasonable expectation that it will not be shared 
beyond the trusted individual.  Without that reasonable expectation of 
privacy, they would not have shared the information in the first place.  
Under this approach, if the trusted individual subsequently disclosed the 
information, he or she would be disclosing “private facts” under the public-
disclosure tort. 
C. Offensiveness 
The third element that a plaintiff must prove is that the disclosure of 
private information would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.  For 
this element, North Carolina should recognize the severity and permanence 
of harm associated with publications made online, effectively lowering the 
burden of proof for online injuries.  
 
 156. M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 511 (Ct. App. 2001) (“But the 
claim of a right of privacy is not ‘so much one of total secrecy as it is of the right to define 
one’s circle of intimacy—to choose who shall see beneath the quotidian mask.’” (quoting 
Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 647 (1994))). 
 157. Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994). 
 158. Id. at 494. 
 159. Id. at 493. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 494. 
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To satisfy the “offensiveness” element in most states, the plaintiff 
must show that the disclosure of his or her “private facts” would be 
offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person.162  The disclosure must 
be the type that would bring shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary 
sensibilities, not the hypersensitive.163  What qualifies as highly offensive is 
ultimately a normative judgment made by the jury based on the customs 
and values of society.164 
Because of the permanency and embarrassment of having nude or 
sexual images or videos shared online, courts in North Carolina should 
presume offensiveness when the disclosure involves nude or sexual images 
of the plaintiff.165  This burden shifting would give victims of harmful 
online disclosures a greater chance to recover.166  As information-privacy 
and cyber-law scholar Danielle Citron argues, this would not be novel, 
because the law already takes a similar approach in the defamation context: 
defamation “has recognized that the longevity of damaging information 
deepens its destructive power.”167  To this end, defamation law gives 
greater protection to defamation in writing (libel claims) than to defamation 
through the spoken word (slander claims).168 
D. Legitimate Public Concern or Newsworthiness 
For the fourth element, the plaintiff must prove that the information 
disclosed was “not of legitimate public concern” or “newsworthy.”169  This 
element serves as an internal protection against legal action that might 
infringe on the First Amendment.170  Here, courts must carefully balance 
the defendant’s First Amendment rights with the plaintiff’s right to 
 
 162. See, e.g., Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1207 (Cal. 2007); Ramsey v. Ga. Gazette 
Publ’g Co., 297 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Nation v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 158 P.3d 
953, 964 (Idaho 2007); Franklin Collection Serv., Inc. v. Kyle, 955 So. 2d 284, 291 (Miss. 
2007). 
 163. See, e.g., Cape Publ’ns, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1982); Smith v. Stewart, 660 S.E.2d 822, 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). 
 164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 165. See Citron, supra note 98, at 1851 (recommending that courts employ this type of 
approach to address injuries that occur online). 
 166. Id. at 1850. 
 167. Id. at 1851. 
 168. Id. 
 169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d. 
 170. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and 
Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 300 n.34 (1983) [hereinafter 
Zimmerman, Requiem] (citing Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 74 (Ga. 
1905)). 
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privacy.171  This balancing allows courts to protect the “free flow of ideas 
and opinions on matters of public interest and concern,”172 while also 
protecting important privacy interests. 
Courts and commentators have adopted a number of approaches for 
analyzing newsworthiness.173 This Subpart briefly explains each approach, 
concluding with a recommendation that North Carolina adopt the 
“California approach,” which involves a factor-balancing test with three 
distinct factors for determining newsworthiness.174 
1. Defer-to-the-Media Approach 
The first approach adopted by some courts to analyze newsworthiness 
is to defer to the media to determine what is newsworthy.175  This approach, 
also known as the “leave it to the press” model, presumes that information 
published by the media is inherently newsworthy.176  This method relies on 
media self-censorship and consumer demand to limit what is deemed 
newsworthy.  Courts that have adopted this formulation make no 
distinction between news as information and news as entertainment.177 This 
 
 171. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975); Gilbert v. Med. 
Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 307 (10th Cir. 1981); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 
(9th Cir. 1975). 
 172. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1998); see also Hall v. Post, 
372 S.E.2d 711, 720 (N.C. 1988) (Frye, J., concurring) (explaining that the chilling effect is 
minimized if the question of whether the published matter is of a legitimate public concern 
is initially a question of law for the trial court). 
 173. See Geoff Dendy, Note, The Newsworthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort, 
85 KY. L.J. 147, 157–64 (1997) (describing five approaches used by courts to address the 
issue of newsworthiness).  Daniel Solove offers a different categorization in his article on 
the public-disclosure tort and the First Amendment.  See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of 
Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1001 
(2003) [hereinafter Solove, Virtues] (presenting three approaches: (1) deferring to the 
media; (2) focusing on the status of the individual; and (3) examining the nature of the 
information). 
 174. California’s test for newsworthiness involves balancing three factors: (1) the social 
value of the information, (2) the extent of the intrusion into private areas, and (3) the extent 
to which the complaining party has voluntarily placed himself in the public eye.  See 
Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 43 (Cal. 1971), overruled on other grounds 
by Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 560 (Cal. 2004). 
 175. See, e.g., Wagner v. Fawcett Publ’ns, 307 F.2d 409, 410–11 (7th Cir. 1962); 
Jenkins v. Dell Publ’g Co., 251 F.2d 447, 451–52 (3d Cir. 1958); Berg v. Minneapolis Star 
& Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 960–61 (D. Minn. 1948). 
 176. Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 170, at 353. 
 177. See, e.g., Jenkins, 251 F.2d at 451–52 (holding that there is no need to determine 
whether publication is for entertainment or information in order to render it “newsworthy”); 
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approach effectively swallows the entire cause of action.178 “Public concern” 
becomes synonymous with “public interest,” leaving very few areas of an 
individual’s private life off limits.179 
This model is also ill suited for the digital age because it does not 
address the many disclosures made by non-media defendants.  Any 
individual with an Internet connection can publish information online, and 
many of the most harmful disclosures are made by non-media individuals. 
Because almost all items are considered newsworthy, the primary 
advantage of this approach is that it does not risk infringing on the First 
Amendment.  However, it does so at the expense of protecting privacy.  
Indeed, the only real difference between a jurisdiction that recognizes this 
approach and a jurisdiction, like North Carolina, that does not recognize the 
public-disclosure tort is formal recognition of the tort.180 
Moving forward, North Carolina should refrain from adopting this 
problematic deference to the media.  Not only is this approach ineffective 
at defining what information is of public concern and addressing online 
disclosures, but it also undermines the viability of the public-disclosure 
tort,181 making it nearly impossible for victims of revenge porn to find 
protection. 
2. Restatement Approach 
A second model for analyzing newsworthiness is outlined in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.  The Restatement model states that “when 
the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is 
entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for 
its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent 
standards, would say that he had no concern,” information ceases to be 
newsworthy.182  This approach was first articulated by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Virgil v. Time.183  In Virgil, the 
Ninth Circuit emphasized that newsworthiness should be a question of fact 
for the jury184 and should be based on the localities’ community mores.185  
 
McNutt v. N.M. State Tribune Co., 538 P.2d 804, 809 (N.M. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that it 
is unnecessary to distinguish between entertainment and information). 
 178. See Solove, Virtues, supra note 173, at 1003. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Dendy, supra note 173, at 158. 
 181. Samantha Barbas, The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort: A Historical 
Perspective, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 172–73 (2010) (describing why the 
newsworthiness defense has all but swallowed the public-disclosure tort). 
 182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 183. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128–30 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 184. Id. 
27
Walters: A Remedy for Online Exposure: Recognizing the Public-Disclosure T
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2015
446 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:419 
One unique aspect of this approach is the “decency limitation,”186 which 
allows the jury to hold defendants liable for disclosures that it finds 
newsworthy if the disclosure is “so intimate and so unwarranted in view of 
the victim’s position as to outrage the community’s notions of decency.”187 
The Restatement approach strikes an effective balance between 
privacy and the First Amendment through strict judicial scrutiny on the one 
hand and jury determinations of newsworthiness and decency on the other.  
Adopting a community-mores standard188 protects the First Amendment by 
broadly defining what information is newsworthy.  The decency limitation, 
also based on community norms, is “not so vague that it will cause a 
‘chilling effect’” on the First Amendment.189  And the judge takes “special 
care”190 to scrutinize the evidence to determine whether the defendant 
should prevail as a matter of law.191 
3.  Nexus Approach 
A third model that courts use to analyze newsworthiness joins a 
“nexus” component to the Restatement test.  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first articulated this approach in Campbell v. 
Seabury Press.192  This approach extends greater protection to privacy by 
adding a requirement that the information disclosed have a close nexus to a 
matter of legitimate concern.193 
The nexus approach involves a closer examination of the information 
disclosed and its purported concern to the public.  It acknowledges that 
“not all aspects of the person’s life, and not everything the person says or 
does, is thereby rendered newsworthy.”194  This approach recognizes the 
need to strike a balance between free speech and individual privacy, 
highlighting that there are areas of one’s life that may not bear any logical 
relationship with some matter of legitimate public concern. 
 
 185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g. 
 186. Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1130. 
 187. Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940). 
 188. This approach is similar to the United States Supreme Court’s First Amendment test 
for obscenity used in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973). 
 189. Dendy, supra note 173, at 165. 
 190. Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1130. 
 191. Dendy, supra note 173, at 162. 
 192. Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).  The 
Tenth Circuit has also adopted this approach.  See Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 
308 (10th Cir. 1981) (explaining that a “newsworthy publication must have some substantial 
relevance to a matter of legitimate public interest”). 
 193. See, e.g., Ross v. Midwest Commc’ns, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 194. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 484 (Cal. 1998). 
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4.  Status-of-the-Plaintiff Approach 
A fourth approach used by some courts to examine newsworthiness is 
to focus on the status of the plaintiff.195  Under this model, what is of 
legitimate public concern turns on whether the plaintiff qualifies as a public 
figure or a private person.196  As in the defamation context, a plaintiff who 
is a public figure loses at least part of his or her privacy,197 but there is 
some disagreement over the extent of this loss.  Some earlier cases held 
that a public figure had no right to privacy at all,198 while more recent cases 
suggest that there must be at least some rational relationship between the 
information disclosed about the public figure and his or her public life.199  
The rationale behind this rule is that public figures have greater access to 
media outlets to advocate on their own behalf,200 and the public has a 
greater interest in information that concerns those who have thrust 
themselves into the public eye,201 or voluntarily entered the public 
discourse.202 
The value in the status-of-the-plaintiff approach is that there is often a 
logical connection between the plaintiff’s status as a public figure or a 
private person and whether the information disclosed is of public concern.  
For example, information about public officials allows constituents to be 
informed voters and hold elected officials accountable.  Information about 
a private person is less likely to be of legitimate public concern unless it 
relates to the community at large. 
This approach also has several flaws.  One problem is that it treats all 
information about public officials or public figures as being of public 
concern.203  It is hard to argue that the social security numbers of public 
 
 195. Solove, Virtues, supra note 173, at 1008. 
 196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmts. e–g (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 197. Id.; see also O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941); Cason v. 
Baskin, 30 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1947). 
 198. See, e.g., Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 (Ct. App. 1962); 
Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 14 Cal. Rptr. 208, 212 (Ct. App. 1961). 
 199. See, e.g., Virgil v. Sports Illustrated, 424 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Cal. 1976). 
 200. See Ali v. Daily News Publ’g Co., 540 F. Supp. 142, 144 (D.V.I. 1982); Warford v. 
Lexington Herald-Leader Co., 789 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Ky. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 580A cmt. b. 
 201. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (explaining that one who 
voluntarily places himself in the public eye—a voluntary public figure—cannot complain 
when he is given publicity, even if the publicity is unfavorable). 
 202. See id. § 652D cmt. g (explaining that an involuntary public figure receives less 
protection than a private person). 
 203. See Solove, Virtues, supra note 173, at 1010. 
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officials are of public concern.204  It is also difficult to contend that private, 
sexual photos of a public figure are of legitimate public concern, especially 
when the public figure has not previously disclosed them to the public.205  
Another issue with this approach is that it lumps all public officials and 
public figures into the same category.  Public figures and public officials 
are different, but defamation law treats them the same.  Furthermore, 
although the law of defamation makes no distinction, not all public officials 
are the same and not all public figures are the same.206 
5.  Nature-of-the-Information Approach 
The fifth approach for determining newsworthiness focuses on the 
nature of the information that is being disclosed.207  Under this narrow 
approach, only information that contributes to “democratic self-governance” is 
deemed to be of public concern.208  The nature-of-the-information approach 
gives the most protection to privacy: disclosures that do not aid in political 
discussion or debate are not of public concern.209  Some argue that this 
approach overprotects privacy interests at the expense of free speech 
because speech that is not related to political matters may still be of public 
concern.210  Because the First Amendment protects more than just political 
speech, this approach is too restrictive.  But the opposite approach—
viewing all speech as newsworthy, regardless of its content—would be too 
broad. 
6.  California’s Approach 
California has developed yet another test for newsworthiness, 
incorporating many of the best models described above.  This test involves 
balancing (1) the social value of the information, (2) the depth of the 
intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and (3) the extent to which the 
 
 204. See id. 
 205. Some may argue with this contention, but even public figures should have privacy 
rights in their own personal photographs.  The recent publication of several celebrities’ nude 
photos illustrates the need for protection.  See Josh Margolin et al., FBI Is “Addressing” 
Massive Celebrity Photo Hack, ABC NEWS (Sept. 1, 2014, 6:40 PM), http://abcnews.go.com 
/Entertainment/fbi-addressing-massive-celebrity-photo-hack/story?id=25200140. 
 206. Solove, Virtues, supra note 173, at 1009–10. 
 207. Id. at 1010–11. 
 208. Id. at 1010. 
 209. See id.  
 210. See id. at 1011–12 (discussing the flaws of this approach); see also Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop 
People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1092–93 (2000) (discussing the 
value of speech on “daily matters”). 
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complaining party has voluntarily placed himself in the public eye.211  The 
plaintiff has the burden of proving that the information is not 
newsworthy.212 
Even if information is deemed newsworthy by the three-factor test, it 
still may not qualify as newsworthy under California’s decency 
limitation.213  To satisfy the decency limitation in California, the plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant disclosed the information with “reckless 
disregard for the fact that reasonable men would find the invasion highly 
offensive.”214  This additional fault requirement is intended to prevent any 
“chilling effect” on the First Amendment.215  Finally, the California 
approach tips the scales in favor of the First Amendment if there is an even 
balance between a newsworthy disclosure and the decency limitation.216 
California’s approach does the best job of balancing the interests of 
privacy and free speech and providing clear instructions to the jury.  The 
three-factor analysis allows the courts to examine the nuances involved in 
privacy injuries.  Moreover, the decency limitation and the principle of 
balancing in favor of free speech in cases of evenly weighted interests 
provide a built-in protection of First Amendment freedoms. 
7.  California’s Factor-Balancing as a Recommended Approach 
North Carolina should adopt California’s factor-balancing approach 
because it adequately protects both privacy and free speech without 
sacrificing either interest.  California law in this area is also one of the most 
developed. Interest balancing is common in First Amendment 
jurisprudence,217 and judicial consideration of multiple factors provides for 
 
 211. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 43 (Cal. 1971), overruled on other 
grounds by Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 560 (Cal. 2004). 
 212. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 768–70 (Ct. App. 1983). 
 213. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 42–43. 
 214. Id. at 44. 
 215. Id. at 43. 
 216. Id. 
 217. In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), Justice Frankfurter’s concurring 
opinion suggested that balancing was not simply the best way, but the only way to evaluate 
First Amendment claims: 
Our judgment is thus solicited on a conflict of interests of the utmost concern to 
the well-being of the country. . . . If adjudication is to be a rational process, we 
cannot escape a candid examination of the conflicting claims with full recognition 
that both are supported by weighty title-deeds. 
Id. at 519 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  Justice Frankfurter recognized that balancing tests 
better reflected the complexities of the free-speech doctrine: 
Absolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and such exceptions 
would eventually corrode the rules.  The demands of free speech in a democratic 
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a nuanced approach that is adaptable to changes in the digital age. 
Under the three-factor test, North Carolina courts should first analyze 
the “social value” of the information published.218  Courts should give 
information that contributes to “democratic self-governance” the most 
protection because one of the primary purposes of the First Amendment is 
to promote “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open [debate] . . . on government 
and public officials.”219  Similarly, as the Supreme Court of the United 
States highlighted in the context of obscenity, information that has 
“literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” should receive protection.220  
Information that furthers one of these interests is more likely to be of public 
concern because it furthers legitimate communal interests. 
On the other side of the spectrum, intimate information pertaining to 
health and sex should receive the least amount of protection unless it 
relates to one of the interests discussed above.221  For example, a 
newspaper that published a photograph of the plaintiff nude in a bathtub 
was not newsworthy, since the publication imparted no legitimate 
information to the public.222  Similarly, a picture of a high-school athlete 
whose genitalia was accidentally exposed while playing soccer,223 or a 
recording of two individuals having sex,224 should receive less First 
Amendment protection.  Giving privacy protection to these areas 
safeguards human dignity and decent behavior, which are indispensable 
attributes of civil society.225 
For the second and third factors, North Carolina courts should analyze 
the depth of the intrusion into ostensibly private affairs and the extent to 
which the plaintiff voluntarily assumed a position of public notoriety.  This 
 
society as well as the interest in national security are better served by candid and 
informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the judicial 
process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian 
problems to be solved. 
Id. at 524–25. 
 218. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 34. 
 219. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 220. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (explaining the three-part test for 
identifying obscenity). 
 221. Edward J. Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court 
Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41, 56–57 (1974) (noting that there is no 
First Amendment right to “satisfy public curiosity and publish lurid gossip about private 
lives”). 
 222. McCabe v. Vill. Voice, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (applying 
Pennsylvania law). 
 223. McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. App. 1991). 
 224. Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
 225. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 154, at 537. 
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involves “a comparison between the information revealed and the nature of 
the activity or event that brought the plaintiff to public attention.”226 
Courts should pull from the law of defamation to conduct this 
examination.  The plaintiff will fall into one of four categories: (1) a public 
official, (2) an all-purpose public figure, (3) a limited public figure, or (4) a 
private person.  Public officials are those “government employees who 
have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or 
control over the conduct of governmental affairs.”227  An all-purpose public 
figure is one who has “achieve[d] such pervasive fame or notoriety that he 
becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts.”228  A limited 
public figure is one who “voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a 
particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a 
limited range of issues.”229  Anyone who does not fall into one of these 
three categories is de facto classified as a private person. 
A plaintiff who qualifies as a private person will receive the most 
privacy protection, and information disclosed about a private person is the 
least likely to be deemed newsworthy.  A plaintiff who qualifies as a public 
official or public figure, whether all-purpose or limited, will receive less 
privacy protection than a private person because information about him is 
most likely to be of public concern.  Most important in this analysis is how 
the status of the plaintiff is relevant to the information disclosed. 
Courts should then examine whether there is some nexus between the 
matter ostensibly of public concern and the plaintiff’s private 
information.230  Not all information disclosed about a public official or 
public figure should be of public concern.  Information related to the 
character or qualifications of a public official, or information related to the 
public figure’s public life, should be of public concern.  But certain 
information—social security numbers or private photos, for example—
should not qualify as a public concern.231  Similarly, not all information 
about a public figure is related to that individual’s public life.  A court 
should ask whether there is a close nexus between the information 
disclosed and the individual’s public life.  If there is not a close nexus, the 
court should give the same protection that it would give to a private person.  
A plaintiff who qualifies as a private person should receive the greatest 
 
 226. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 484 (Cal. 1998). 
 227. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). 
 228. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Shulman, 955 P.2d at 484. 
 231. See Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 841–42 (C.D. Cal. 
1998) (finding that the broadcast of a video recording of sexual relations between a famous 
actress and a rock star was not a matter of legitimate public concern). 
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amount of protection, because his or her information is the least likely to be 
of public concern.232 
Courts should examine each of these factors where it is appropriate, 
and give each factor its necessary weight based on the context of each 
unique case.  No one factor is dispositive in this analysis, and courts should 
balance the factors against the defendant’s right to free speech.  In sum, 
while this element accounts for the public’s right to know about 
information of public concern, applied correctly, it should leave room to 
protect the plaintiff’s private life.233 
Adopting the public-disclosure tort in this manner will provide a 
much-needed civil remedy for victims of revenge porn in North Carolina.  
For example, a teenager involved in the recent North Carolina incident of 
disclosure could bring a claim against the individual who published his or 
her image on Instagram.  The teenager would be able to prove all of the 
elements required by the tort and would likely recover damages against the 
publisher. 
IV. OVERCOMING FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS 
Those who criticize the public-disclosure tort typically raise concerns 
about its effect on free speech protected by the First Amendment.234  
Despite scholarly criticism, the public-disclosure tort has continued to 
expand across the nation,235 and many scholars defend the tort for its ability 
to specifically address the harms caused by the disclosure of private 
 
 232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (explaining 
that a plaintiff who is a private person does not have to prove the same level of fault as a 
public official or a public figure in the context of defamation). 
 233. See Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 719 (N.C. 1988) (Frye, J., concurring). 
 234. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting Truthful Speech: Narrowing the Tort of 
Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 423 (2008) (arguing that civil liability 
for disclosure is objectionable under the First Amendment because truthful speech should 
not be censured); Richard A. Epstein, A Taste for Privacy?  Evolution and the Emergence of 
a Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 665 (1980) (arguing that erasing the disclosure tort 
might be best because of its constitutional problems and because it gives courts the function 
of deciding the weight and significance of true information about a plaintiff); Zimmerman, 
Requiem, supra note 170, at 291 (arguing that the disclosure tort should be ended, as its 
constitutional problems are overwhelming, and that if it does continue, the meaning of 
private information and newsworthiness would have to be severely limited). 
 235. Jared A. Wilkerson, Battle for the Disclosure Tort, 49 CAL. W. L. REV. 231, 266–67 
(2013) (noting the continued expansion of the public-disclosure tort, despite related 
scholarly criticism); John A. Jurata, Jr., Comment, The Tort That Refuses to Go Away: The 
Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489, 509 
n.132, 510 n.139 (1999) (noting that from 1993 to 1999 alone, at least twenty-one plaintiffs 
prevailed, while only eighteen had prevailed prior to 1980). 
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information.236  Although the public-disclosure tort does implicate First 
Amendment issues, North Carolina courts are capable of balancing First 
Amendment interests against the interests of privacy.237  Accordingly, 
North Carolina should not be deterred from adopting the public-disclosure 
tort for fear of First Amendment concerns. 
Prior to the 1960s, tort-based lawsuits were considered private state 
actions that did not implicate First Amendment scrutiny.238  In 1964, the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan239 changed this, and tort law that placed restrictions on speech 
became subject to constitutional scrutiny.240  Not long after New York 
Times, the Supreme Court decided a line of cases that held that imposing 
civil liability for speech would require a heightened standard of 
constitutional scrutiny.241 
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,242 the Supreme Court applied constitutional 
scrutiny to the false-light tort.243  About a decade later, the Court first 
addressed the public-disclosure tort in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.244  
In Cox Broadcasting, the Court simply reiterated that it is unconstitutional 
to find liability for truthful speech by the press where the information is 
part of the public record.245  The Court declined to hold that the public 
disclosure of private facts required proof of falsity, or that tort liability for 
truthful speech is per se unconstitutional.246  With several opportunities to 
declare the public-disclosure tort unconstitutional, the Court has declined to 
 
 236. Solove, Virtues, supra note 173, at 1025–28 (describing how the public-disclosure 
tort can adapt to the digital age); Zimmerman, New Privacy, supra note 122, at 114 (arguing 
that the balance struck between privacy torts and the First Amendment is sufficient to 
address complicated privacy problems in the digital age). 
 237. See Hall, 372 S.E.2d at 719 (“I do not believe that the media should be given a 
license to pry into the private lives of ordinary citizens and spread before the public highly 
offensive but very private facts without any degree of accountability.  Such is not required 
by either the federal or state constitutions.”) (Frye, J., concurring). 
 238. See Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil 
Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1658 (2009). 
 239. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 240. Id. at 277. 
 241. See Solove & Richards, supra note 238, at 1658–60 (discussing these cases). 
 242. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
 243. Id. at 390–91 (holding that the “actual malice” standard in Sullivan also applied to 
the tort of false light, requiring the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted with “actual 
malice” by either knowingly making a false statement or acting recklessly with regard to the 
truth). 
 244. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495–96 (1975). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id.; see also Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 
52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1197 (2005). 
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do so, making it clear that each ruling has only applied to the specific facts 
of each case.247 
If anything, the Supreme Court has expanded its protection of privacy 
interests.  In Bartnicki v. Vopper,248 the Court recognized the possibility 
that privacy could trump newsworthiness concerns in certain contexts.249  
The Court partially struck down a provision in the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act that made individuals liable for disclosing 
information that they knew was obtained by an illegal wiretap.250  Justice 
Breyer, in a concurring opinion, emphasized that the laws must strike a 
“reasonable balance between their speech-restricting and speech-enhancing 
consequences.”251  At the outset, the Court acknowledged that the case 
presented a conflict between two “interests of the highest order—on the 
one hand, the interest in the full and free dissemination of information 
concerning public issues, and, on the other hand, the interest in individual 
privacy and, more specifically, in fostering private speech.”252  The Court 
emphasized that “the fear of public disclosure of private conversations 
might well have a chilling effect on private speech,” acknowledging that 
privacy laws also protect First Amendment freedoms.253 
The Court implicitly endorsed the balancing of free speech and 
privacy interests, reiterating that information of public concern tips the 
scales in favor of free speech.254  A common criticism of the balancing 
between these two interests is that the Constitution protects speech, not 
privacy.255  But Justice Breyer asserts in Bartnicki that the conflict posed 
between speech and privacy is a conflict between two rights of 
constitutional stature.256  Given these two competing interests, Justice 
 
 247. See Chemerinsky, supra note 234, at 653–56 (describing the Supreme Court’s 
narrow decision addressing disclosure of private, true information). 
 248. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 249. Id. at 532; see also Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and 
Judicial Regulation of the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1045–48 (2009). 
 250. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533–35. 
 251. Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 252. Id. at 517 (majority opinion). 
 253. Id. at 533. 
 254. Id. at 534 (“In these cases, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the 
interest in publishing matters of public importance.”).  In a concurring opinion, Justice 
Breyer emphasized that the information published was of “unusual public concern” because 
there was a threat of potential harm to others.  Id. at 535–36 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 255. See Solove, Virtues, supra note 173, at 994–95. 
 256. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Rodney A. Smolla, 
Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 
96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1150 (2002) (noting the conflict between speech and privacy as 
outlined in Bartnicki).  In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Supreme Court 
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Breyer asserted, the Court must strike “the proper fit.”257 
As the California approach demonstrates, striking “the proper fit” is a 
product of strict judicial scrutiny of the evidence as a matter of law and 
jury determinations based on an application of three factors.  North 
Carolina courts should empower the jury to analyze the newsworthiness of 
a disclosure by examining the three factors, while giving the court the 
discretion, as a matter of law, to decide how those three factors are 
balanced against the defendant’s First Amendment rights.258  Moreover, 
requiring the plaintiff to prove reckless disregard as to the offensiveness of 
the publication provides additional protection to free speech.  As the 
California courts have done, when the two interests are evenly balanced, 
the court should tip the scales in favor of the First Amendment to preserve 
breathing room for free speech. 
Indeed, North Carolina courts already must navigate the First 
Amendment analysis in many areas where speech is involved, including in 
the defamation and IIED contexts.  The vast majority of states that 
recognize the public-disclosure tort confront the First Amendment analysis 
on a case-by-case basis rather than reject the tort entirely.259  Courts need 
not decline recognition for fear of constitutional scrutiny; rather, they 
should carefully balance the First Amendment and privacy interests to find 
the proper fit in each case. 
CONCLUSION 
Adopting the public-disclosure tort in North Carolina will not only fill 
existing privacy gaps, it will also deter harmful disclosures of private 
information in the future.  This tort offers the North Carolina teenagers who 
were recently harmed by the publication of their private photographs a 
meaningful remedy.260  As these types of injuries arising from the public 
disclosure of true, but private, facts increase in the digital age, the tort of 
 
recognized that the “right to privacy” based on substantive due process also encompassed 
the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”  Id. at 598–99. 
 257. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997)). 
 258. See Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 488 (Cal. 1998) (finding 
published information newsworthy as a matter of law); Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 720 
(N.C. 1988) (Frye, J., concurring) (“[T]he chilling effect is minimized if the question of 
whether the published material is of legitimate concern to the public is initially a question of 
law for the trial court.”). 
 259. See supra note 27 (listing each state’s stance on the tort). 
 260. See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
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public disclosure of private facts provides the best way to control the 
spread of these injuries. 
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